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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ROYAL RESOURCES, INC. 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
GIBRALTER FINANCIAL CORP. , 
GIBRALTER SECURITIES CORP., 
(a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Gibralter Financial Corp.), 
LYNN DIXOH, and GEORGE PERRY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 15817 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT LYNN DIXON 
Pursuant to Rule 75(p)(l) and (2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the appellant submits the following reply brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant calls to the Court's attention the following 
facts: 
That the material contained on Page 4 of respondent's brief 
beginning with the last paragraph with reference to respondent's 
investigation with appellant's counsel of the possibility of 
recovery on behalf of the respondent the federal insurance 
program (SCIPIC) was not set forth in the record. 
The appellant Dixon provided the respondent with all 
records of the defendant company which he had (Exh. 4-P and 5-P), 
but could not provide respondent with other records since he 
was not the custodian or otherwise in possession of such 
records. The respondent states that appellant was the 
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President of Gibralter Securities Corp. This was true at 
one time, but not throughout the whole time respondent dealt 
with the company, nor at the time the production order was 
entered. At that time, appellant Dixon was not an officer 
of the company, and the company was in bankruptcy. The 
affidavit of the appellant in response to the discovery 
motions and orders ( was specifically to the effect 
that appellant had produced what he had the power to produce. 
( ). No motion was made pursuant to Rule 37(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, for any special sanction against 
the appellant. None was appropriate since Rule 34, U.R.C.P. 
requires that person have "possession, custody or control" 
of the documents sought to be produced. 
The action in the instant case was brought against the 
appellant Dixon and expressly in his capacity as "registered 
agent" of "Defendant Corporation". (R. 2) The respondent's 
amended complaint also referenced Dixon as "registered agent 
of Defendant Corporation". (R. 9-10) Although respondent 
sought to hold Dixon responsible in his individual capacity 
it was clear the respondent was moving against Dixon knowing 
he was a corporate agent. 
The respondent made demands for payment on the checks 
from the corporation not Dixon. (R. ). Respondent sued 
the corporation and took judgment first against the corpora-
tions (R. 24) and sought satisfaction of the judEment against 
Gibralter, on the basis of a stipulation asking appellant's 
cooperation, against the federal insurer SCIPIC. The 
testimony of Lois Crowder, the bookkeeper of Gibralter Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Securities, was clearly to the effect that respondent Royal 
Resources and Dee Woolley did not have customer accounts 
because they were not true securities customers. (R. 80) 
Respondent was actually in the loan business, and had to be 
paid from general funds. Respondent was not paid because 
Gibralter was broke. (R. 79-81). The funds due respondent 
were from a sale of stock by a customer of Gibralter. 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT CANNOT BASE LIABILITY ON THE RIGHT 
TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE STRUCTURE SO AS TO HOLD 
APPELLANT LIABLE AS THE ALTER EGO OF THE CORPORATION. 
In Point I of respondent's brief, it is recognized that in 
circumstances like those involved in the instant case that an 
agent may not be liable. The respondent, however, asserts: "It 
is well established that under various circumstances the corporate 
veil can be pierced to get at officers or directors when the 
facts warrant the application of equitable principles to go 
behind the corporate personality to the individual." 
This is a new position urged by the respondent. At no 
time in this case has the respondent contended that it was 
seeking to pierce the corporate veil. Indeed, respondent's 
complaint expressly recognized the appellant as an agent for 
the corporate defendants. This is acknowledged in the respondent's 
recital of the facts. The doctrine of alter ego is not applicable 
in this case. This case involves a corporation with which 
respondent had done business on a number of occasions and which 
had an existence separate and· apart from Lynn Dixon. Respondent 
made demands for payment against Gibralter Securities without 
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ever addressing those demands to Lynn Dixon. The corporation 
existed during this period of time when Lynn Dixon was not a 
corporate officer. No evidence was introduced to show that 
the corporate entity was the alter ego of Lynn Dixon, but rather 
the respondent first sought recovery against the corporation 
and then when it could not bring itself within the indernnificatio 
provisions of a securities purchaser, and finding the corporation 
insolvent, sought recovery against Lynn Dixon whom respondent 
characterized in the pleadings as the agent of the corporation. 
The respondent has alluded to factors that courts consider 
in making judgment as to whether a corporation is the alter ego 
of a person, or a mere sham to avoid individual responsibility, 
Amoco Chemicals Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589, 56 7 P. 2d 133 7 (1977) 
In that case, the court alluded to the "absence of corporate 
records." Such is not the case before the court. Gibralter 
Securities Corporation was an ongoing enterprise with existence 
quite apart from appellant Lynn Dixon. It had corporate records 
in volume, some of which were produced at trial. This was hardly 
a sham enterprise. This position was not alleged or urged 
below. Respondent cites the above case and others for the 
proposition that fraud in the use of the corporation will 
justify abandoning the corporate status. No fraud was ever 
alleged in conjunction with respondent's complaint. Rule 
9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
"In all averments of fraud or mistake, the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake 
shall be stated with particularity." 
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This provision was not complied with. General allegations 
are not sufficient, Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806, 
809 (Utah 1974). No fraud was either alleged or proved. 
Such a contention seems to be an afterthought. Respondent 
would have this Court impose liability against a disclosed 
agent simply because of insolvency of the principal. This 
is not the law of agency or responsibility of corporate 
agents. In Shaw v. Bailey-McCune Co., 11 Utah 2d 93, 355 
P.2d 321 (1960), this Court affirmed dismissal of an action 
against individuals in a suit brought against a corporation 
and its officers and shareholders. In doing so, the Court 
stated: 
"A corporation is a statutory entity which 
is regarded as having an existence and per-
sonality distinct from that of its stock-
holders even though the stock is owned by 
a single individual. 
Under some circumstances the corporate 
entity may be disregarded in the interest 
of justice in such cases as fraud, contra-
vention of law or contract, or public wrong. 
However, reat caution should be exercised 
y t e courts in ing t e entity. 
(Emphasis added) 
No finding was made by the trial court that Gibralter Securities 
Corporation was a sham or the alter ego of Lynn Dixon. No 
request for such a finding was made nor would the evidence justify 
such a conclusion. Gibralter Securities existed independent of 
Lynn Dixon and therefore cannot be ignored so far as Dixon's 
liability is concerned. Cf. Utah State Bldg. Connnission v. Great 
American Indemnity Co., 105 Utah 11, 18, 140 P.2d 763 (1943). 
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In Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526 (19JJ) 
plaintiff brought action against a corporation and its president 
to recover the amount allegedly due under an employment contract. 
The corporation was in financial difficulty and couldn't meet 
the plaintiff's contract. In reversing the trial court's 
judgment against the corporate president who had allegedly 
negotiated the contract, this Court stated: 
"The term 'alter ego' is used to describe 
a situation where the courts go behind the 
corporate entity and hold a stockholder liable 
for the debts of the corporation or to hold that 
it is the stockholder and not the corporation 
which owns the assets. 
The doctrine is generally applied to situations 
known as 'one-man corporations,' i.e., where one 
man owns practically all of the stock, either 
directly or through others who hold it for his 
use and benefit, and where the stockholder uses 
the corporation as a shield to protect him 
from debts or wrongdoings. It cannot be applied 
to make a stockholder liable for the legitimate 
debts of a corporation unless he is so closely 
allied with the corporation through ownership 
and management as to enable the courts to see 
clearly that the corporate entity is but a sham 
and it is the stockholder who is doing business 
behind the corporate shield. 
In the instant matter it is not shown that 
Walker owns a majority of the stock of either 
corporation of which he was president." 
Most recently, in Centurian Corp. v. Fiber Chem, Inc., 562P 
1252 (Utah 1977), this Court rejected a contention that defend~t 
could apply monies received against a corporate indebtedness for 
a corporation claimed to be the alter ego of the plaintiff. 
The Court stated that the trial court had not found facts to 
fit the defense. The Court noted that in order for the alter 
ego doctrine to apply there must be "something akin to fraud 
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or deception which thus placed defendant at a disadvantage 
and worked an injustice." In the instant case, no fraud was 
plead, no fraud was established. Testimony before the trial 
court was only that Lynn Dixon as an agent for Gibralter 
Securities Corporation received monies in conjunction with a 
stock sale which because of Gibralter's insolvency the return 
funds on the stock sale could not be paid to plaintiff. 
It is apparent that respondent had no claim for relief 
either under a theory of liability of Lynn Dixon as an agent 
for Gibralter Securities Corporation or under a theory that 
Lynn Dixon should be liable as the alter ego of Gibralter 
Securities Corporation. The facts of the case disclose 
no basis for the trial court's judgment. 
POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT COULD NOT HOLD APPELLANT LIABLE 
WHERE APPELLANT WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGED AGENT OF A 
KNOWN PRINCIPAL. 
The appellant in its initial brief asserts that the trial 
court improperly used appellant's inability to produce 
record evidence as affirmative evidence of the validity of 
the respondent's claim. The appellant in its initial brief 
has shown that such action by the trial judge was improper. 
First, it appears that appellant was, at the time of the 
suit, not connected with Gibralter. Appellant, Lynn Dixon, 
did arrange for the production of what records there were of 
the transaction. See Testimony of Lois Crowder (Tr. 76). 
There was no showing that any other specific and relevant 
records existed. Dixon took the stand and testified fully 
as to the transaction. The trial court arbitrarily charged Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the appellant with the burden of proof apparently treating a 
claim of non-production as affin:lative evidence against 
appellant. As is shown in the appellant's brief such 
application of the rule on failure to produce relevant 
competent evidence is error. The trial court went beyond 
merely using the facts as inference. Nor was an inference 
justified since there is no showing of "actual suppression" 
by Dixon. Cf. 31 C.J.S. Evidence, § 156(b) cited p. 16 
respondent's bri8f. In the same section, p. G53, it is 
observed: 
"Inferences from the suppression of documents or 
failure to produce them on notice increase the 
weight of evidence produced by the other party 
as to the contents of the documents, or as to the 
facts to which the documents are relevant, but do 
not constitute independent evidence of a face." 
Thus the trial court went beyond the permissible rule. 
The respondent relies on Rasbury v. Bainum, 15 Utah 2d 62, 
387 P.2d 239 (1963) and Tucker v. Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.Zd 
440 (1964). Neither case is in point, each case deals with a 
willful failure to make discovery justifying the trial court in 
either striking the errant party's cause of action or imposing 
default. This was not the action requested by respondent nor tak1 
by the trial court. 
Even so, the respondent would not be entitled to judgment 
if the facts as known and plead by respondent show no legal basis 
for relief. In this case respondent plead the agency of Dixon, 
all the facts show that Dixon was acting in an agency relationshiJ 
with Gibralter Securities. Woolley of Royal Resources had a 
pattern of dealing with Gibralter, he acted and understood 
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that he was dealing with Gibralter. Woolley made demand for 
payment on Gibralter and not upon Dixon. The money that 
respondent was entitled to was from the sale of stock of a 
client of Gibralter and not a personal obligation of Dixon. 
Therefore, in spite of any lack of discovery, Royal Resources 
was not entitled to relief against Lynn Dixon. 
Further, appellant asserts that any claim against Dixon 
was barred by respondent taking judgment against Gibralter 
and seeking Dixon's aid in satisfaction of that judgment 
against SCIPIC in Gibralter's name. Only when it appeared 
that no claim against SCIPIC would satisfy the judgment did 
respondent then actively pursue Dixon. Appellant in his 
initial brief shows that under these circumstances that 
judgment was barred against Dixon. Restatement of Contract 
§ 119(1). 
Even so, since an agent is not liable for the duties 
and obligations of the principal under such circumstances 
judgment against Dixon would not otherwise be proper. See 
Point I, Appellant's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the respondent's 
arguments raised in opposition to the appellant's points on 
appeal demonstrate that the judgment below should be reversed. 
The respondent's contention that liability should be imposed 
against appellant under a theory of piercing the corporate 
veil is neither legally or factually well founded. The 
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respondent's contentions as to the application of the law on 
a claimed failure of appellant to produce documents is 
neither procedurally or conceptually proper. An analysis of 
the cases and theories raised by respondent in answer to the 
appellant's complaints of error in the trial below make it 
apparent that under the facts and law applicable to this 
case the judgment entered by the trial court was erroneous. 
This Court should reverse. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD J. LEEDY 
610 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant Lynn Dixon 
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